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in the world, [war with Japan] was the
least likely to happen.” After all, the two
countries shared an alliance that dated
to the beginning of the century. Extension of the “ten-year rule,” first promulgated in 1919, saw war in the Far
East as highly unlikely for at least another decade. As Bell makes clear, this
rule underlay a compromise between
the Treasury, concerned about costs,
and the Admiralty, which sought completion of its Singapore naval base and
more ships. By the mid-1930s, an outof-office Churchill began to change his
position, now expressing (as were
Whitehall ministries) growing concern
about Japan’s intentions. However, his
greater worry about a rearming Germany dominated naval needs in the Far
East. Even in 1939 he argued the unlikelihood of a Japanese attack on faroff Singapore, just as he (and others)
felt naval power alone could hold off
aggression. Events, of course, proved
this to be wishful thinking.
B. J. C. McKercher, the sole revisionist
here, teaches history at the Royal Military
College of Canada. He sees Churchill’s
famous speeches against Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s as revealing a
politician on the make: “Quite simply,
he sought the premiership above all
else; thus, his criticisms of British foreign and defense policy were less selfless
than either he or his disciples later
claimed.” McKercher’s arguments help
balance excessive praise (years later) of
Churchill’s stance in this period. He
strongly defends prime ministers Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain as
working to rebuild British defenses just
as Churchill was attacking their seeming inaction. Munich is seen here—as
by other revisionists—as a vital play for
time to allow rearmament to reach full
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effect. Churchill’s years in the political
wilderness “resulted from his own follies, primarily his antipathy to Baldwin
and Chamberlain,” during which, he
argues, “Churchill consistently exaggerated threats.”
David Jablonsky teaches at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and
makes clear Churchill’s fascination with
what technology offered to overcome potential enemies. There are a host of interesting Churchill quotes on the impact
(sometimes literally) of newly developed
dum-dum bullets, improved pistols, and
later the tank and the airplane. At the same
time, Churchill was often concerned
about possible unintended effects of technological choice, as well as the ethics of
applying certain approaches. As the author notes, “The basic problem, Churchill
came to realize, was that technology had
changed the scale of warfare.” Before and
during the war, he was fascinated with
technical options, not all of them workable. Those that did work—such as signals intelligence—made a huge difference
in the outcome.
This is a very useful collection, carefully
researched and written, adding insight
to what we know of Churchill’s varied
diplomatic and military roles in a world
that moved from cavalry charges to hydrogen bombs. Michael Handel would
surely be pleased.
CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

George Washington University

Mullis, Tony R. Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army
Operations in Bleeding Kansas. Columbia: Univ.
of Missouri, 2004. 273pp. $40.50

Tony Mullis, a serving officer in the
U.S. Air Force, takes a close look at a
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time when approximately 10 percent of
the U.S. Army was intimately involved
in one of the most challenging and politically charged assignments ever given
to the U.S. military. Assigned occupation duties in a land where tribal loyalties had been the primary form of
government, Army officers, in cooperation with diplomats appointed by the
president, were tasked to assist a fledgling democracy attain statehood while
avoiding incipient civil war. The task
was complicated by the infusion of
ideologically motivated outsiders, most
of them heavily armed. The two main
local factions committed a variety of
atrocities, including the massacre of
innocent civilians. Elections, new to the
area, were viewed with open suspicion
by most of the population. Local militias were often little more than muscle
for political leaders. Many of the thornier underlying political issues had religious and economic overtones. Several
Army officers assigned to these duties
were involved in scandals, and at least
one associated court-martial received
national attention. Meanwhile, powerful individuals in Washington disagreed, sometimes publicly, over
tactics, strategy, and policy in the affected region. To make matters worse,
ingrained organizational barriers and
an inherent resistance to change prevented promising new technologies
from being used with maximum effectiveness. Finally, while the Army may
have portrayed its role as one of neutral
professionalism, both Democrats and
Republicans were using the results of
the occupation as a key component of
their respective strategies for the next
presidential election. The year was
1854, and the theater of operations was
the Kansas Territory.
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Peacekeeping on the Plains clearly began
life as a doctoral dissertation. In its introduction Mullis lays out his basic
premise. Debunking the perhaps popular conception that the United States
has but recently come to experience
peace operations, Mullis shows that the
U.S. Army has been involved in missions of this type since the first days of
the Republic—though this historical involvement has long been overlooked
and underanalyzed. Mullis seeks to begin correcting this omission by examining in some detail the 1855 punitive
expedition against the Lakota (of the
Great Sioux Nation) as an example of
the Army’s efforts to keep peace in
“Bleeding Kansas.” Chapter 1 gives an
overview of the U.S. Army’s involvement in peace operations, and chapter 2
provides background information on
the issue of slavery and the creation of
the state of Kansas. Chapters 3 and 4
take a detailed look at the 1855 punitive
expedition led by General William S.
Harney. Chapters 5 through 8 deal with
Army operations supporting civil actions
in Kansas from 1854 to 1857. A conclusion and epilogue complete the work.
As was often demonstrated during the
1990s, the line between peace enforcement and war is often difficult to determine. This was no less true in 1855. The
U.S. Army used deadly force against the
Lakota, took hostages, and committed
various acts that would, by the standards of today, be judged illegal. Yet, as
Mullis points out, these operations were
carried out with a political objective in
mind, and, in the main, they were effective. Furthermore, Harney’s success
did have a positive impact, in that they
influenced other tribes to remain
peaceful. Such results would seem to
have contemporary parallels with peace
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operations conducted by the French in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the British in Sierra Leone, and the U.S.
Marines in Liberia.
The parallels between current operations in Iraq and those of the Army in
bleeding Kansas are even more strongly
apparent. Faced with a unique and unwelcome mission, the Army faced a
steep learning curve. There were missed
opportunities and at least several instances of officers engaging in dubious
ethical behavior in order to take advantage of perceived business opportunities. The initially appointed political
leadership proved too vacillating and
incompetent to deal with the complex
difficulties inherent in the situation.
Furthermore, the entire issue was a
red-hot political football, which the
newly created Republican Party was using to excoriate the incumbent
Democrats.
Like those against the Lakota, the peace
operations in Kansas were eventually
successful. Nationalizing factional militias, deploying federal forces to prevent
civil strife, and arresting infiltrating
partisans all contributed to political stability and a safe election environment.
Yet, as Mullis points out, several facets
of policy either failed or were badly
flawed. These included the failure to
utilize the telegraph to transmit information rapidly to and from the area of
operations. Mail was simply too slow to
be operationally relevant—the telegraph could have been a powerful tool
in the hands of the administration.
Peacekeeping on the Plains helps fill a gap
in the coverage of some of the formative
experiences of the U.S. Army. This is
valuable in and of itself. However, the
more immediate contribution of the
work is to identify lessons learned in the
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mid-1800s that may be applicable in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
However, as one would expect given the
immense technological differences between the eras, these lessons are rather
general in nature.
For example, it proved impossible to
craft orders so detailed as to cover every
situation the occupying forces encountered. Until local authorities began exercising authority they technically did
not possess, the result was a paralysis of
action. In connection with the Lakota
reprisal, Mullis also makes a convincing
argument for assigning older and presumably more mature officers to positions that would in these operations,
under normal circumstances, go to
younger officers.
Mullis’s work also shows that the central conundrum of peace operations
was as valid in the mid-nineteenth century as it is today. Enough troops with
the right leadership can impose a peace,
and might even be able to enforce a
peace, but unless the root causes of
conflict are resolved the peace has to be
pinned into place by bayonets and will
not endure. The peace imposed on the
Lakota by the U.S. Army did not last
long; it took a civil war and the destruction of the Confederacy to deal with the
root causes that led to bleeding Kansas.
As mentioned earlier, this work is
clearly derived from a dissertation, and
for that reason, while it is intellectually
stimulating, at times the writing is
somewhat ponderous, repetitive, and
dry. Yet the contribution this work
makes to understanding both past and
present eras of significance makes the
effort worthwhile.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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